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Judge William W Schwarzer and 
Automatic Disclosure 
Carl Tobias* 
During the spring of 1995, Senior United States DistrictJudge 
William W Schwarzer concludes nearly half a decade of distin-
guished service as the Director of the Federal Judicial Center 
(FJC), which is one of the primary research arms of the federal 
courts. Judge Schwarzer carefully and thoroughly discharged the 
challenging responsibilities of that post, ably heading the FJC in 
difficult times for the federal courts, which have been increas-
ingly required to achieve more with fewer resources. 
Judge Schwarzer assumed the directorship of the Center after 
serving for fourteen years on the Northern District of California. 
When Judge Schwarzer was a member of that court, he earned a 
well-deseived reputation as an innovative judge who vigorously 
practiced judicial case management and actively participated in 
numerous efforts to improve the revision and application of 
federal civil procedures. 
As Judge Schwarzer leaves the position of Director and re-
turns West to sit by designation on the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and to teach part-time at Hastings 
College of the Law in San Francisco, the jurist should focus his 
considerable energy and expertise on an important procedural 
development which he was substantially responsible for initiating. 
Judge Schwarzer ought to guarantee that automatic, or mandato-
ry pre-discovery, disclosure, which was one of the most contro-
versial procedures that the United States Supreme Court has 
ever included in amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, receives rigorous assessment. 1 
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for valuable 
suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, and the 
Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
' See FED. R CIV. P. 26(a)(l), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402, 431-32 (1993). See gmerally 
Griffin 8. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in DisCU1Jery - The Rwh to Refurm, 27 GA. L REV. 1 
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During the late 1980s, Judge Schwarzer became one of the 
earliest and strongest advocates of automatic disclosure, a proce-
dure which requires that litigants divulge information which is 
important to their cases before parties commence formal discov-
ery.2 Judge Schwarzer enthusiastically and masterfully shepherd-
ed the highly controversial proposal to modify Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 26 through an extremely contentious rule revi-
sion process which culminated in the amendment's promulga-
tion in 1993.3 Judge Schwarzer attempted to persuade various 
rule revision entities, such as the Advisory Committee on the 
Civil Rules, that adoption of the mechanism was critical,4 and 
wrote law review articles urging and defending the procedure's 
implementation.5 
Automatic disclosure has continued to be controversial since it 
became effective in December 1993. Indeed, fewer than one-half 
of the ninety-four federal districts have chosen to apply the 
federal revision in Rule 26 prescribing disclosure as it was adopt-
ed in 1993.6 That change included a provision for the federal 
(1993); Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time 
fur Refurm1, 138 F.R.D. 155 (1991); Carl Tobias, In Defense of &perimentation with Automatic 
Disclosure, 27 GA. L. REv. 665 (1993). 
2 See William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and DisC(JIJtry Refurm, 
50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703, 721-23 (1989); see also Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of 
Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals fur Change, 31 VAND. L. REv. 1295, 1361 (1978) (af-
fording earlier suggestion that automatic disclosure be adopted). 
• See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, In Defense of "Automatic Disclosure in DisC(JIJtry, • 27 GA. 
L. REv. 655 (1993); see also Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 judicial Improvements 
Acts, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1589, 1611-16 (1994) (describing contentious rule revision process). 
See generally Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Peroasive Myth of Peroasive Discovery 
Abuse and the Consequences fur Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1393 (1994); Ralph K. 
Winter, In Defense of Discovery Refonn, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 263, 265-71 (1992). 
' This assertion is premised on conversations with several individuals who are knowl-
edgeable about the rule revision process in which automatic disclosure was adopted. See 
generally Tobias, supra note 3, at 1611-16. 
5 See, e.g., William W Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure 
& More Effective Than Discovery1, 74 JUDICATURE 178 (1991); Schwarzer, supra note 3. See 
generally Terry Carter, judge Schwarzer Goes to Washington, CAL. LAW., SepL 1991, at 21, 21. 
• See Alfred W. Cortese & Kathleen L. Blaner, Mandatory Disclosure Rule 26(a) (1): 
Not the Rule of Choice (OcL 28, 1994) (copy on file with author) (indicating fewer than 
one-third of districts apply federal revision); DONNA STIENSTRA, IMPLEMENTATION OF DIS-
CLOSURE IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT CoURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO CoURTS' RE-
SPONSES TO SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26 (Mar. 24, 
1995) (copy on file with author) (indicating fewer than one-half of districts apply federal 
revision). 
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districts to reject or to vary the federal amendment. 7 Only a 
very small number of states have decided to impose disclosure 
requirements,8 although numerous states usually adopt most 
federal revisions relatively soon after they take effect.9 
Several important reasons explain why automatic disclosure 
has been so controversial. Nearly all elements of the organized 
bar and a number of additional interests have contended that 
the disclosure requirements fail to state clearly exactly what 
information must be disclosed. These groups also argue that the 
requirements could impose an extra layer of discovery, raise 
ethical questions, and may increase litigation costs. 10 
Another significant reason for the controversy is that automat-
ic disclosure received comparatively little experimentation before 
the measure was incorporated in the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure.11 Correspondingly, limited empirical data on automatic 
disclosure's operation has been systematically gathered, analyzed, 
and synthesized, although there is some anecdotal information 
available. For instance, the American Bar Association surveyed 
lawyers' experience with the mechanism in numerous Early Im-
plementation District Courts which experimented with the mech-
anism under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA).12 
7 See FED. R CIV. P. 26(a)(l). 
8 Arizona is the only state which broadly prescribed automatic disclosure before the 
Federal amendment became effective. See Symposium, Mandating Disclosure and Limiting 
DisCflllery: The 1992 Amendments to Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and Comparable Federal 
Proposals, 25 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1 (1993); see also AlAsKA SUPREME COURT, FINAL DRAFT DISCOV· 
ERY AND DISCLOSURE RULES (adopting disclosure procedure which will become effective on 
July 15, 1995). See gmerally Jill Schachner Chanen, States Considering Discuvery Refurm, A.BA 
J., Apr. 1995, at 20. California had prescribed disclosure in narrowly confined contexts. See 
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE§§ 90-95, 1141.ll(d) (West 1982 & Supp. 1995). 
9 See John P. Frank, Local Rules, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 2059 (1989); John B. Oakley & 
Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Proce-
dure, 61 WASH. L REv. 1367 (1986). 
'
0 See, e.g., Mengler, supra note 1, at 158; Carl Tobias, Collision Cou~e in Federal Civil 
DisCflllery, 145 F.RD. 139, 142 (1993). See gmerally Tobias, supra note 3, at 1612. 
11 See Bell et al., supra note 1, at 17-18; Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, 
Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REv. 753, 754 (1995); Linda S. 
Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory lnfurmal Discuvery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 
N.C. L REv. 795, 813-21 (1991); see also infra note 12 and accompanying text (stating that 
automatic disclosure received some experimentation in EIDCs). 
12 See AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, SECTION OF LITIGATION, MANDATORY PREDISCOVERY DISCLO-
SURE: A FIRST LoOK (1994); see also Tobias, supra note 3, at 1611 (examining experimenta-
tion in EIDCs). 
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Moreover, the RAND Corporation is currently evaluating disclo-
sure in a number of districts as one component of a study that 
the CJRA authorized.1g Some Early Implementation District 
Courts have included analyses of disclosure in the annual assess-
ments which the 1990 legislation requires courts to prepare. 14 
This current lack of information on automatic disclosure 
means that Judge Schwarzer must do everything practicable to 
insure that it receives more rigorous evaluation. The jurist 
should institute measures that will facilitate the systematic collec-
tion, assessment, and synthesis of empirical data on the 
procedure's implementation and operation. This effort ought to 
focus on ascertaining as definitively as possible the mechanism's 
effectiveness in reducing expense and delay in federal civil litiga-
tion. 
The specifics of such an analysis warrant relatively little treat-
ment in this Essay partly because the Federal Judicial Center 
possesses considerable experience and expertise, having per-
formed a number of analogous assessments in the past. Recent 
· examples are the valuable FJC studies of the operation of the 
1983 amendment of Rule 11. These evaluations were substantial-
ly responsible for the provision's significant revision in 1993.15 
Another helpful illustration is the FJC's studies of court-annexed 
arbitration, an important alternative to traditional dispute resolu-
tion.16 It also appears preferable in such an assessment to em-
" See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §105, 104 Stat. 5089, 
5097-98 (1990); see also Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on 
Implementation of the Piwt Program of the Civil justice &form Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1303, 
1327-29, 1335-36 (1994) (providing RAND preliminary study). 
14 See, e.g., DISTRICT OF IDAHO, CML JUSTICE REFoRM ACT ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ANNU-
AL EVALUATION REPORT 4 (May 1994); CMLJUSTICE EJ{PENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 
OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA, ANNUAL AssESS-
MENT 5-6 (Oct 1994); see also 28 U.S.C. § 475 (Supp. V 1993) (prescribing annual assess-
ments). 
" See, e.g., THOMAS E. WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988); ELIZA· 
BETH C. WIGGINS ET AL., FINAL REPORT ON RULE 11 TO THE ADVISORY CoMMITfEE ON CML 
RULES OF THE JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (1991); see also William w 
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1013 (1988) (providing suggestions partly 
responsible for Rule 11 's revision). The American Judicature Society also undenook a valu-
able Rule 11 study on which the FJC should rely. See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use 
and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REv. 943 (1992). 
16 See E. ALLAN LIND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRA-
TION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983); BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, CoURT-AN-
NEXED ARBITRATION JN TEN DISTRICT COURTS (1990); see also 28 u.s.c. §§ 651-58 (1988) 
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ploy a single entity, such as the FJC, which can serve as a clear-
inghouse in coordinating the effort and can apply the same 
techniques for analyzing automatic disclosure in different dis-
tricts. 
Some guidance may be useful, however. The Federal Judicial 
Center should probably assemble and assess the available anec-
dotal information on automatic disclosure while exercising cau-
tion in relying on such data. For example, certain anecdotal 
information suggests that the procedure works well when the 
material divulged is rather general; in comparatively simple, 
routine cases, such as automobile accident litigation; and once 
lawyers have secured some familiarity with the measure. 17 Dis-
closure similarly appears to function rather effectively when the 
attorneys who must reveal information know each other or are 
relatively civil and collegial. The FJC must evaluate considerably 
more experimentation, however, before it can verify these ideas. 
It will also be important for the Federal Judicial Center to 
consult the methodologies and results of other analyses of auto-
matic disclosure. These include the American Bar Association 
study;18 the evaluations of disclosure included in the annual 
assessments that the CJRA requires districts to compile, a num-
ber of which have yielded rather inconclusive determinations 
regarding disclosure's efficacy;19 and the study that RAND is 
presently conducting.20 The FJC should, of course, be careful to 
avoid duplicating these efforts. For instance, the FJC might want 
to analyze disclosure in districts other than the twenty courts 
that RAND is evaluating. 
(prescribing court-annexed arbitration). 
17 See, e.g., Carl Tobias, A Progress Report on Automatic Disclosure in the Federal Districts, 155 
F.R.D. 229, 231 (1994); Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil justice Refurm in Montana, 54 
MONT. L. REv. 357, 363 (1993). See generally Tobias, supra note 3, at 1615. 
18 See supra note 12 and accompanying texL 
19 See, e.g., CML JusnCE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE EAsrERN DJSfRICT OF 
NEW YORK ANN. REP. 3, f>.8 Uan. 25, 1994); REPoRT ON THE IMPACT OF THE CoST AND DE-
LAY REDUCTION PLAN ADOPTED BY THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT CoURT FOR THE SOUTHERN 
DISTRICT OF TEXAS 13-15 (Apr. 6, 1993). See generally supra note 14 and accompanying texL 
20 See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also IssacharofI & Loewenstein, supra 
note 11, at 75~57 (conducting study which relies primarily on formal models of litigation 
behavior drawn from three areas: economics, psychology, and what may be called strategic 
theory). 
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It is appropriate to defer to the Federal Judicial Center's 
experience and expertise regarding numerous significant techni-
cal details of assessment. For instance, the FJC's past studies of 
Rule 11 should provide instructive insights on the type of infor-
mation to be collected; how to ascertain automatic disclosure's 
comparative efficacy, if any, in decreasing expense and delay 
and in facilitating settlement; and how best to assemble and 
evaluate the relevant material. More specifically, evaluators 
should attempt to determine as conclusively as possible whether 
disclosure is affording its purported benefits, such as reducing 
cost and delay and promoting settlement,21 and whether it is 
imposing its ascribed disadvantages, such as adding another layer 
of discovery.22 I do not, and the Federal Judicial Center is un-
likely to, underestimate the difficulty of certain aspects of rigor-
ously analyzing disclosure, such as establishing relevant baselines 
or precisely measuring expense and delay reduction.2g 
As Judge William Schwarzer departs the Federal Judicial Cen-
ter after rendering almost half a decade of dedicated service, he 
should insure that one of the most controversial procedural 
innovations in the history of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, for whose adoption he bears substantial responsibility, 
receives a careful test of its effectiveness. The jurist can achieve 
this by insuring that disclosure is systematically evaluated 
through the collection, assessment, and synthesis of empirical 
data on the procedure's operation. 
" See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. 
22 See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
"' See Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil justice Refurm Act, 30 HARV.]. ON LEGIS. 115, 124 
(1993). 
